Abby Wood, Ph.D.
awood@law.usc.edu
University of Southern California
Professor of Law, Political Science, and Public Policy at University of Southern California
Research Interests
Campaign Finance
Bureaucracy
Experimental Research
Campaign Advertising
Administrative Law
Countries of Interest
United States
Our deregulated campaign finance system has a race problem. We use innovations in statistical methods and the universe of campaign contributions for federal elections to analyze the racial distribution of money in American politics between 1980 and 2012. We find that white people are severely overrepresented among donors. A stunning 91% of money contributed to state and federal candidates by individuals has come from non-Hispanic white donors. The racial gap in campaign contributions is significantly greater than the gap in voter participation and elected office holding. It is also relatively constant across time and elected offices. This result is an important missing piece in the conversation about equity in political participation. We argue that the courts and Congress should take steps to address the racial gaps in campaign finance participation. The participation and representation problems that flow from racial inequality in deregulated campaign finance could inform claims under the Voting Rights Act (VRA), and politico-financial inequalities certainly bear on the normative problems that the statute intends to address. But the most politically viable way to address the campaign finance racial gap lies in adoption of public financing for political campaigns, which offer the promise of increasing the racial representativeness of campaign contributions. When racial representativeness in contributions is improved, improved equality in the distribution of resources and power in electoral and political systems should follow.
Do audits by executive agencies impact the behavior of those audited? Does revealing negative information about legislators affect electoral results and behavior? Institutions that encourage transparency, such as campaign finance disclosure, influence mass and elite behavior. Campaign finance transparency provides information to voters during legislative campaigns about the character of candidates, and this information affects voter and legislator behavior. The U.S. Federal Election Commission conducted random audits of 10 percent of U.S. House members in the 1970s. This FEC program is the only randomized experiment a U.S. agency has conducted on federal legislators and their electorates. We find that audited legislators were more likely to retire and faced more competitive re-elections relative to the control group, an effect that is amplified among incumbents whose audits revealed campaign finance violations. Further, campaign finance scandals are associated with lower incumbent vote shares and approval; and more negative advertisements in the 2000s.
In an age of dark money—the anonymous political spending facilitated by gaps in our campaign finance disclosure laws after Citizens United—the Supreme Court’s campaign finance disclosure jurisprudence may be on a collision course with campaign finance disclosure laws. It is urgent for the Court to understand the informational benefits of campaign finance disclosure, so it may avoid this collision. Campaign finance transparency teaches us more than one-dimensional information about the candidate’s left- or right-leaning policy preferences. It also helps us learn about candidate type. Social scientists, including myself, have run several studies examining voter learning from campaign finance information. As I explain in this Article, when voters learn about a candidate’s position with regard to dark money, they learn and vote differently than if they did not have that information. Experimental and observational research also suggests that voters punish noncompliance and reward overcompliance. In other words, transparency about campaign finance disclosure and compliance informs voters. These findings point to useful policy innovations for states and cities, while the federal government is unable or unwilling to regulate. The innovations I propose include “disclosure disclaimers,” which inform voters about the presence of dark money in a campaign, and campaign finance audits, which inform voters about compliance with campaign finance laws. But more basic loophole-closing can also provide helpful information to voters. I explain implications for the courts, campaigns, and policymakers, as well as limitations on the argument.
Are the methods of causal inference and, in particular, randomized controlled trials, compatible with the study of political history? While many important questions regarding political institutions and American political development cannot be answered with randomized controlled trials, scholars can and should be using the many instances of randomized experiments conducted by and within government institutions to further our understanding of institutions and political behavior. We argue that a surprising abundance of opportunities are available for scholars to utilize methods of random audits as natural experiments. Public and administrative officials have engaged in randomized interventions or audits to test for policy effects, to encourage compliance with the law, or to distribute government resources or personal risk to citizens fairly. With rare exceptions, such audits have not been leveraged by scholars interested in American political development or political history. Examples of randomized controlled trials conducted by agencies or institutions throughout US history are offered, and a historical random audit of members of the US Congress by the Federal Election Commission is highlighted. We conclude with limitations and advice on how to analyze the effects of randomized controlled trials conducted by governments. Scholars can use historical randomization to enhance causal inference and test theoretical implications, though deep knowledge of descriptive historical data and events are required to discover historical randomizations within political and legal institutions.
Campaign finance disclosure is the last (somewhat) robust regulation we have in American campaign finance, and it is under threat. We urgently need more research on disclosure. Regulatory complexity makes studying campaign finance disclosure daunting. It also creates so-called dark money and anonymous speech online. Scholars must understand the existing regulatory loopholes as they plan studies to avoid biased estimates and understand the conditions in which their results generalize to a broader population. The court's disclosure jurisprudence is thin and based on largely unproven assumptions. As the research on campaign finance disclosure matures, scholars should take a broad view of the costs and benefits of disclosure, rather than the narrow, court-led focus many studies have had until now. We must also take seriously the ways in which cognitive limitations can limit the benefits of disclosure. I explain the doctrine and review existing studies, highlighting opportunities to expand the literature.
In this article we evaluate the relationship between political control and bureaucratic performance using information requested by researchers via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and Congress via congressional committee requests. The information requested was the same, and the timing of requests was similar. We find modest evidence of a relationship between agency politicization and a lack of responsiveness to requests for information from the public and Congress. Politicized agencies are slower to respond to requests even when controlling for agency size and workload. There is little evidence, however, that these agencies are more likely to respond poorly when they do respond. The difficulties in responding appear to be due to poor performance of the FOIA offices, either because political actors focus more on other agency activities or because of poorer management agency-wide. We conclude that efforts to make agencies responsive to elected officials may hurt management performance.
In recent years, the courts have invalidated a variety of campaign finance laws while simultaneously up- holding disclosure requirements. Courts view disclosure as a less-restrictive means to root out corruption while critics claim that disclosure chills speech and deters political participation. Using individual-level contribution data from state elections between 2000 and 2008, we find that the speech-chilling effects of disclosure are negligible. On average, less than one donor per candidate is likely to stop contributing when the public visibility of campaign contributions increases. Moreover, we do not observe heterogeneous effects for small donors or ideological outliers despite an assumption in First Amendment jurisprudence that these donors are disproportionately affected by campaign finance regulations. In short, the argument that disclosure chills speech is not strongly supported by the data.
Most literature on criminal deterrence in law, economics, and criminology assumes that people who are caught for a crime will be punished. The literature focuses on how the size of sanctions and probability of being caught affect criminal behavior. However, in many countries entire groups of people are “above the law” in the sense that they are able to evade punishment even if caught violating the law. In this paper we argue that both the perceived probability of being punished if caught and the cultural acceptance of elites evading punishment are important parts of theorizing about deterrence, particularly about corruption among political elites. Looking at data on parking violations among diplomats in New York City 1997–2002, we explore how diplomats from different rule-of-law cultures respond to sudden legal immunity. The empirical observations provide clear evidence of both the stickiness and the gradual weakening of cultural constraints.
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