Allison Harris, Ph.D.
allison.harris@yale.edu
Assistant Professor
Yale University
About Me:
I am an assistant professor of political science at Yale University. My research interests are in American politics with a focus on judicial politics, criminal justice, state politics, and inequality. My current research program examines how various types of diversity among judges affect disparities in criminal sentencing outcomes. I am also working on a series of projects that investigates whether returning citizens and their relations can be encouraged to register to vote.
Research Interests
Judicial Politics
State and Local Politics
Representation and Electoral Systems
Crime Politics
Countries of Interest
United States
Publications:
Journal Articles:
This paper provides evidence of racial variation in traffic enforcement responses to local government budget stress using data from policing agencies in the state of Missouri from 2001 through 2012. Like previous studies, we find that local budget stress is associated with higher citation rates; we also find an increase in traffic-stop arrest rates. However, we find that these effects are concentrated among White (rather than Black or Latino) drivers. The results are robust to the inclusion of a range of covariates and a variety of model specifications, including a regression discontinuity examining bare budget shortfalls. Considering potential mechanisms, we find that targeting of White drivers is higher where the White-to-Black income ratio is higher, consistent with the targeting of drivers who are better able to pay fines. Further, the relative effect on White drivers is higher in areas with statistical over-policing of Black drivers: when Black drivers are already getting too many fines, police cite White drivers from whom they are presumably more likely to be able to raise the needed extra revenue. These results highlight the relationship between policing-as-taxation and racial inequality in policing outcomes.
This essay explores four key dimensions of political science literature on the U.S. criminal legal system, by way of introducing articles in the special issue on criminal justice featured in the Journal of Racial and Ethnic Politics. We situate police as an institution of social control, rather than providing safety for people vulnerable to crime. The vast array of policy tools to surveil, track, and detain citizens, which lack commensurate restraints on their application, amount to a finely tuned carceral machine that can be deployed against groups newly identified as deviant. We therefore turn attention to this dynamic with our second theme: the criminalization of immigrants, the expansion of interior immigration enforcement, and the consequent targeting of Latinx people. We likewise discuss lessons for reform that can be drawn from research on representation and the political socialization that occurs as a consequence of involuntary contact with the system. We conclude with a brief discussion of directions for future research. The criminal legal system is a key force for persistent racial and class inequality. By turning attention to the politics of the criminal legal system, we forward a critical and understudied facet of American political life that intersects with all corners of the discipline.
How do we know whether judges of different backgrounds are biased? We review the substantial political science literature on judicial decision making, paying close attention to how judges' demographics and ideology can influence or structure their decision making. As the research demonstrates, characteristics such as race, ethnicity, and gender can sometimes predict judicial decision making in limited kinds of cases; however, the literature also suggests that these characteristics are far less important in shaping or predicting outcomes than is ideology (or partisanship), which in turn correlates closely with gender, race, and ethnicity. This leads us to conclude that assuming judges of different backgrounds are biased because they rule differently is questionable. Given that the application of the law rarely provides one objectively correct answer, it is no surprise that judges' decisions vary according to their personal backgrounds and, more importantly, according to their ideology.
Even at their most salient, judicial retention elections do not increase turnout on Election Day. However, those who vote often participate in judicial retention races at higher levels than usual following salient judicial decisions. I use a series of difference-in-differences analyses to estimate the effect of the Iowa Supreme Court’s legalization of same-sex marriage on the subsequent retention races. I find that retention race participation was higher than we would have otherwise expected after the decision. Scholars often cite the infrequence with which justices are removed as evidence of justices’ relative independence from voters in retention elections, but the overwhelming retention of these justices does not mean they are independent from voters. Increases in the number of ballots cast in these races is perhaps more important than increases in negative votes when it comes to judicial independence, because each vote is an evaluation of the justices, whether positive or negative.