City: Atlanta, Georgia
Country: United States
I am a Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. I previously served as an APSA Congressional Fellow (2004-2005). I am also currently the Editor-in-Chief of Justice System Journal, and the state Director of the Georgia Legislative Internship Program.
Gender and Politics
Gender And Politics
I study how governmental institutions work, and how structural design can influence the behavior of actors within these institutions. My work focuses primarily on US courts and the US Congress. I have written extensively on the politics of federal judicial selection, with emphasis on the Senate confirmation process. My work also examines the puzzle of unanimity on the US Supreme Court. Finally, my most recent book (Gendered Vulnerability: How Women Work Harder to Stay in Office, 2018, UMichigan Press) argues the electoral impediments facing female legislators results in them acting as more faithful representatives for their constituents once in office.
We argue that women face a more perilous electoral environment than men. Women are aware of the electoral risks they face, and these electoral risks in turn shape their behavior once in elected office. We thus argue that female members of Congress engage in a more constituent-oriented legislative behavior than their male counterparts. We find notable gender differences for both members of the House and Senate across a multitude of Congressional activities, ranging from staffing decisions to trips home to committee memberships to bill sponsorship activity to roll call voting. Overall, women are more likely to substantively represent their constituents' interests than men, and these findings have important consequences for our understanding of the modern US Congress.
We offer a novel, comprehensive, and dynamic theory for understanding how justices of the United States are able to agree. We argue that previous examinations of judicial decision-making ignore unanimous decisions. By leaving unanimous opinions out of the equation, scholars miss a great deal of the influence of legal forces on judicial behavior. We posit and show that when the level of legal certainty as to the correct legal answer is higher, unanimity is more likely. Our findings demonstrate that the law exerts a constraining force on individual attitudes, and reinforces that the US SUpreme Court views part of its job as reinforcing and clarifying the rule of law.