Catherine Lena Kelly, Ph.D.
Catherine Lena Kelly is an Advisor at the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative in the Research, Evaluation, and Learning Division and a Penn Kemble Democracy Forum Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy. She works on research, monitoring, and evaluation related to security and justice, post-conflict reconstruction of the justice sector, countering violent extremism, women’s rights, anti-corruption, judicial training, and political economy approaches to rule of law reform. Her forthcoming book, Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in West Africa: The Case of Senegal is under contract with Palgrave Macmillan. Kelly has been a Postdoctoral Fellow at Washington University in St. Louis, the West Africa course coordinator at the U.S. Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute, and a consultant for organizations including Freedom House, the International Budget Partnership, and the University of Cape Town’s African Legislatures Project. Kelly has research and evaluation experience in various West, Central, and North African countries and is both fluent in French and proficient in Wolof. Her analysis has appeared in venues including the Journal of Democracy, Comparative Politics, Electoral Studies, and The Washington Post Monkey Cage blog. Kelly holds a Ph.D. in government from Harvard University, a Certificate in International Politics from Free University of Brussels, and a B.A. from Washington University.
Religion & Politics
Rule Of Law
Monitoring & Evaluation
Countries of Interest
Central African Republic
Over thirty years after Africa’s post-Cold War “democratic experiments,” the number of registered political parties in many countries continues to multiply and there is a paucity of parties that consistently oppose incumbents throughout any given presidency. These patterns challenge theories predicting that parties performing poorly in elections will disappear or fuse with others and that many of the remaining parties will rival those in government by staying outside of any electoral coalitions built by the incumbent president. African policymakers suggest that party proliferation detracts from political development, but they lack systematic illustrations of proliferation’s consequences. Marshaling original data from elite interviews and archival research in Senegal, one of Africa’s oldest multiparty systems, this study characterizes the conditions under which parties consistently oppose incumbents on an uneven playing field. Focused on the Wade presidency, this article argues that most party leaders are primarily concerned with negotiating patronage; thus, few are regular vote-seekers and fewer challenge the ruling party over multiple consecutive elections. Case studies illustrate that party leaders are reliant on personal resources for party-building and rarely possess the two endowments that facilitate consistent opposition: experience as state administrators and international private financing.
The Senegalese example is often used to suggest that Muslim-majority countries are capable of democratizing if the state is equidistant from all religions. Historically, Islam lacks a hegemonic status in Senegal's legal order, and national politics exhibits the "twin tolerations," the mutually respectful relationships between religious and governmental authorities that are necessary for democracy. These continuities cannot explain why Sufi orders (turuq) changed from supporting a single-party authoritarian system in the 1960s-1980s to reinforcing serious electoral contestation as of the 1990s; economic crisis fostered the change. During structural adjustment in the 1980s, economic shocks weakened the ruling party, inducing it to negotiate a democratic electoral code with opponents. The reforms significantly increased electoral uncertainty by the late 1990s, which changed the behavior of state and religious actors. Abdoulaye Wade broke the tradition of presidential neutrality towards religion, favoring Murids over Tijans in hope of getting elected by Murid voters. Turuq members more frequently created political parties (to oppose or collaborate with the president) or grassroots movements (to denounce government corruption and anti-democratic practices). The history of the "Senegalese social contract" suggests why movements more successfully channeled democratic energies, while parties led by Sufi figures had limited impact.
Analyzes the 2012 presidential elections in Senegal.
The number of registered political parties in many countries has multiplied since the beginning of Africa’s “democratic experiments” in the 1990s, when national constitutions were rewritten to allow for multiparty elections lacking under previous authoritarian regimes. By 2010, after roughly twenty years of multiparty competition, Cameroon had over 250 parties, Madagascar and Senegal over 150, and Burkina Faso, Benin, and Mali over 100. Although social scientists do predict proliferation during transitions to multipartism, they also expect parties performing poorly in initial elections to disappear or fuse with more popular parties. These expectations are based on the assumption that parties aggregate interests, mobilize voters, and empower citizens to hold politicians accountable – functions emphasized in studies based on Western experiences. However, many African parties stand for personal and parochial interests. This can inhibit the development of parties whose “brand” is easy for citizens to identify when they vote; it can also curtail opposition parties from serving as consistent counterweights to the ruling party. Providing much-needed, systematic empirical demonstrations of party proliferation’s role in politics, this book examines the phenomenon’s sources, documents its consequences for opposition and contestation, and deciphers what these patterns mean for democratization in Senegal. Senegal had three political parties as of 1976 and its first multiparty presidential election in 1978, over a decade earlier than most African countries. Given its longer experience with multipartism, Senegal is where we would least expect proliferation to persist. Yet, by 2010, Senegal had 174 registered parties, and has 255 today. Focused on Senegal during the presidencies of Abdou Diouf and Abdoulaye Wade, Party Proliferation analyzes patterns of African party politics that are not yet fully theorized, including party creation as a form of negotiating patronage, the paucity of parties that consistently oppose any given incumbent, the emergence of regime insiders as the president’s most viable electoral challengers, and the difficulties of using ruling party institutions to manage elite conflict in fluid party systems. The book argues that these features of the party system were sustained by the uneven playing field that Diouf and Wade manipulated when Senegal was an electoral democracy in a minimalist sense, but a competitive authoritarian regime according to stricter criteria. Methodologically, the book asserts that social scientists should consider more fully the local institutional meanings, grassroots political context, and individual agency in the analysis of party politics. Original data created from the author’s fieldwork in French and Wolof informs each chapter.
This report presents the results of a detailed diagnostic study of public perceptions of the justice and security sectors in the Central African Republic (CAR) conducted in fall 2016. Based on interviews with 2,650 adult residents of the city of Bangui, the report examines citizens’ experiences of violence, insecurity, conflict resolution and social cohesion, along with citizens’ perceptions of specific justice sector actors, self‐ perceived knowledge of the justice system, and expectations with regards to police and the courts. The study was initiated by the American Bar Association’s Rule of Law Initiative as a means to inform its efforts to support justice sector reforms in the country, and by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative’s Peace and Human Rights Data program. The results are intended for use by any researcher or practitioner involved with the justice and security sectors in CAR.
The analysis presented here highlights three core themes that should inform how rule of law practitioners engage in CVE-related work. The first is that violent extremism usually has multiple causes, many of which are local. The drivers of violent extremism thus vary considerably by context, with a variety of ideologies, economic conditions, and political and social situations shaping individual motivations to support extremist ideas or activities. Secondly, several potential drivers of violent extremism – including government repression, the curtailment of civil liberties, and state illegitimacy or collapse – are essentially rule of law issues. As such, rule of law interventions can potentially help address these drivers. Rule of law development assistance seeks to promote human rights, curtail arbitrary state violence, build more inclusive societies, and develop state legitimacy and capacity, particularly within the justice system. It also helps build the social contract between the state and citizens and – by attempting to correct injustice – helps reduce social and political alienation that can lead to violent extremism. Finally, some CVE focused programs can have unintended negative consequences, for example by endangering the civil liberties of the people CVE programming is meant to support, and because such interventions can alienate target communities and divert resources from other needed rule of law programs.
Spoke in Wolof and French about party politics and party proliferation to a Senegalese audience in urban and rural areas.
What the Data Says About Democracy and Governance in North and Sub-Saharan Africa
Analyzing Democracy, Rule of Law, and Governance Programs Holistically - and Strengthening Monitoring & Evaluation in the Process
Here's Everything You Need to Know About Senegal's Latest Referendum
Why the U.S. Military Should Care About African Opposition Parties (with Jason Warner)
Did the June 23 Movement Change Senegal?
Types of Cookies we use
This site employs two first-party cookies (served from us and by us that are essential for the site to operate) and two third-party cookies that deliver external services.
We use a server-generated session cookie to remember you when you are logged in to the site. This is essential to making sure that your profile details are those that are updated when you log in to make changes. This also lets us know who is logging into the site and when.
This site also uses a cookie that is created by your browser to remember when you agree to the cookie notice popup. This cookie stores nothing but the word "true" if you have agreed to the terms and is deleted when you close your browser. This cookie's only function is to prevent the cookie notice from popping up every time you refresh the site's homepage.
How to Disable Cookies Altogether
Information on how to disable cookies in your browser can be found here. Please keep in mind that disabling cookies will prevent the essential functions of most interactive websites and web applications, this site included.
This privacy notice discloses the privacy practices for (womenalsoknowstuff.com). This privacy notice applies solely to information collected by this website. It will notify you of the following:
Information Collection, Use, and Sharing
If you have any questions about this Privacy Notice, or need to contact us, we can be reached at .
Terms and Conditions
Last updated: August 04, 2019
Please read these Terms and Conditions ("Terms", "Terms and Conditions") carefully before using the http://womenalsoknowstuff.com website (the "Service") operated by Women Also Know Stuff ("us", "we", or "our"). Your access to and use of the Service is conditioned upon your acceptance of and compliance with these Terms. These Terms apply to all visitors, users and others who wish to access or use the Service. By accessing or using the Service you agree to be bound by these Terms. If you disagree with any part of the terms then you do not have permission to access the Service.
Our Service allows you to post, link, store, share and otherwise make available certain information, text, graphics, videos, or other material ("Content"). You are responsible for the Content that you post on or through the Service, including its legality, reliability, and appropriateness. By posting Content on or through the Service, You represent and warrant that: (i) the Content is yours (you own it) and/or you have the right to use it and the right to grant us the rights and license as provided in these Terms, and (ii) that the posting of your Content on or through the Service does not violate the privacy rights, publicity rights, copyrights, contract rights or any other rights of any person or entity. We reserve the right to terminate the account of anyone found to be infringing on a copyright. You retain any and all of your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Service and you are responsible for protecting those rights. We take no responsibility and assume no liability for Content you or any third party posts on or through the Service. However, by posting Content using the Service you grant us the right and license to use, modify, publicly perform, publicly display, reproduce, and distribute such Content on and through the Service. You agree that this license includes the right for us to make your Content available to other users of the Service, who may also use your Content subject to these Terms. Women Also Know Stuff has the right but not the obligation to monitor and edit all Content provided by users. In addition, Content found on or through this Service are the property of Women Also Know Stuff or used with permission. You may not distribute, modify, transmit, reuse, download, repost, copy, or use said Content, whether in whole or in part, for commercial purposes or for personal gain, without express advance written permission from us.
When you create an account with us, you guarantee that you are above the age of 18, are a woman in the academic field of Political Science, and that the information you provide us is accurate, complete, and current at all times. Inaccurate, incomplete, or obsolete information may result in the immediate termination of your account on the Service. You are responsible for maintaining the confidentiality of your account and password, including but not limited to the restriction of access to your computer and/or account. You agree to accept responsibility for any and all activities or actions that occur under your account and/or password, whether your password is with our Service or a third-party service. You must notify us immediately upon becoming aware of any breach of security or unauthorized use of your account.
The Service and its original content (excluding Content provided by users), features and functionality are and will remain the exclusive property of Women Also Know Stuff and its licensors. The Service is protected by copyright, trademark, and other laws of both the United States and foreign countries. Our trademarks and trade dress may not be used in connection with any product or service without the prior written consent of Women Also Know Stuff. Links To Other Web Sites Our Service may contain links to third party web sites or services that are not owned or controlled by Women Also Know Stuff Women Also Know Stuff has no control over, and assumes no responsibility for the content, privacy policies, or practices of any third party web sites or services. We do not warrant the offerings of any of these entities/individuals or their websites. You acknowledge and agree that Women Also Know Stuff shall not be responsible or liable, directly or indirectly, for any damage or loss caused or alleged to be caused by or in connection with use of or reliance on any such content, goods or services available on or through any such third party web sites or services. We strongly advise you to read the terms and conditions and privacy policies of any third party web sites or services that you visit.
We may terminate or suspend your account and bar access to the Service immediately, without prior notice or liability, under our sole discretion, for any reason whatsoever and without limitation, including but not limited to a breach of the Terms. If you wish to terminate your account, you may simply discontinue using the Service, or notify us that you wish to delete your account. All provisions of the Terms which by their nature should survive termination shall survive termination, including, without limitation, ownership provisions, warranty disclaimers, indemnity and limitations of liability.
You agree to defend, indemnify and hold harmless Women Also Know Stuff and its licensee and licensors, and their employees, contractors, agents, officers and directors, from and against any and all claims, damages, obligations, losses, liabilities, costs or debt, and expenses (including but not limited to attorney's fees), resulting from or arising out of a) your use and access of the Service, by you or any person using your account and password; b) a breach of these Terms, or c) Content posted on the Service.
Limitation Of Liability
In no event shall Women Also Know Stuff, nor its directors, employees, partners, agents, suppliers, or affiliates, be liable for any indirect, incidental, special, consequential or punitive damages, including without limitation, loss of profits, data, use, goodwill, or other intangible losses, resulting from (i) your access to or use of or inability to access or use the Service; (ii) any conduct or content of any third party on the Service; (iii) any content obtained from the Service; and (iv) unauthorized access, use or alteration of your transmissions or content, whether based on warranty, contract, tort (including negligence) or any other legal theory, whether or not we have been informed of the possibility of such damage, and even if a remedy set forth herein is found to have failed of its essential purpose.
Your use of the Service is at your sole risk. The Service is provided on an "AS IS" and "AS AVAILABLE" basis. The Service is provided without warranties of any kind, whether express or implied, including, but not limited to, implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, non-infringement or course of performance. Women Also Know Stuff, its subsidiaries, affiliates, and its licensors do not warrant that a) the Service will function uninterrupted, secure or available at any particular time or location; b) any errors or defects will be corrected; c) the Service is free of viruses or other harmful components; or d) the results of using the Service will meet your requirements.
Some jurisdictions do not allow the exclusion of certain warranties or the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages, so the limitations above may not apply to you.
These Terms shall be governed and construed in accordance with the laws of the state of Arizona and the United States, without regard to its conflict of law provisions. Our failure to enforce any right or provision of these Terms will not be considered a waiver of those rights. If any provision of these Terms is held to be invalid or unenforceable by a court, the remaining provisions of these Terms will remain in effect. These Terms constitute the entire agreement between us regarding our Service, and supersede and replace any prior agreements we might have had between us regarding the Service.
We reserve the right, at our sole discretion, to modify or replace these Terms at any time. If a revision is material we will provide at least 30 days notice prior to any new terms taking effect. What constitutes a material change will be determined at our sole discretion. By continuing to access or use our Service after any revisions become effective, you agree to be bound by the revised terms. If you do not agree to the new terms, you are no longer authorized to use the Service.
If you have any questions about these Terms, please contact us at .