International Law & Organization
Of all the countries in Latin America, Mexico has the strongest economic ties to the United States, formalized by the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994, but this Agreement does not preclude Mexico from targeting the United States in the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism. In fact, the Agreement’s dispute settlement system encourages it to do so if the complaint at hand is to have a fair consideration. The North American Free Trade Agreement’s dispute-resolution system goes to a board containing representatives from the three member countries, which includes by default the complainant state and the defendant state. Therefore, even though Mexico has the closest economic relationship with the United States of the Latin American states considered in this project, it is also the most likely to target the United States in the World Trade Organization. This article focuses on how trade ties constrain Mexico’s use of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism against its largest trade partner
Previous studies have focused on individual preferences regarding trade liberalization without considering an individual’s perceptions of income inequality. This study aims to utilize the 2007 Latinobarametro to test a hypothesis regarding the relationship between an individual’s perceived income inequality and their support for trade liberalization in their country. The authors focus primarily on Latin America, as it is a region that has a long, entrenched tradition of income inequality with far reaching political and economic consequences. It is also a region that is relatively new to trade liberalization, as it only began to open up in the 1980s, after a decade-long commitment to import substitution industrialization. Design/methodology/approach The authors utilize a logit model to analyze the 2007 Latinobarametro data to test the hypothesis. Findings The authors find that individuals who perceive income inequality to be fair in their country are more likely to support trade liberalization, whereas those who perceive income inequality to be unfair are less likely to support liberalization. Originality/value This study allows for a more complete portrait of what influences individual preferences toward trade policy and advocates for policy elites to be more responsive to their citizens’ concerns about trade liberalization.
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to focus on the influence of domestic legal traditions on dispute behavior, which has been widely examined in the conflict literature, within the World Trade Organization (WTO). States with a civil legal tradition hold treaties and agreements in high esteem. Therefore, they will be more likely to file trade complaints and pursue adjudication when compared to states with common or mixed legal traditions. Design/methodology/approach – The hypotheses in this study have been tested using a quantitative test with data from the WTO regarding trade disputes. Findings – While civil law states are more likely to file complaints, they are less likely to pursue adjudication over a negotiated settlement. Originality/value – This study brings to light how domestic legal systems affect state behavior within an international legal body.
The relocation of Diageo's rum production facility from Puerto Rico to the U.S. Virgin Islands in 2010 had larger ramifications than the shifting of jobs from one island to another. Related to this move is the distribution of monies associated with the excise tax placed on each bottle of rum produced in these territories. For close to five decades, Puerto Rico received a large majority of these funds and invested them in economic growth. To secure a larger share of the cover‐over money, the U.S. Virgin Islands promised large corporate kickbacks funded by the tax. This article examines which strategy has an effect on economic growth, the cover‐over as a supplemental fund or as an enticement to multinational corporations. It concludes that the use of the cover‐over as a supplement to island growth is ineffective and that constrained growth on the islands is due to their political status as territories of the United States.