Kristina Meshelski, Ph.D.

kristina.meshelski@csun.edu

Associate Professor

California State University, Northridge

Year of PhD: 2011

City: Los Angeles, California

Country: United States

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About Me:

I specialize in social and political philosophy, including issues of race, gender, and sexuality. I wrote a dissertation on John Rawls's nonideal theory with John Simmons at the University of Virginia. I am also interested in early modern philosophy, especially Spinoza's metaphysics.

Research Interests

Political Theory

Affirmative Action

Distributive Justice

Intersectionality

Housing

Publications:

Journal Articles:

(2019) Amartya Sen's Nonideal Theory, Ethics and Global Politics

Amartya Sen argues that Rawls’s theory is not only unnecessary in the pursuit of justice, but it may even be an impediment to justice in so far as it has discouraged more useful work. Against what he considers the dominance of transcendental theory, Sen calls for a more realistic and practical ‘comparative’ theory of justice. Sen’s negative point has been widely discussed, but here I develop a reconstruction of Sen’s positive theory (a combination of Adam Smith’s Impartial Spectator, Social Choice Theory, and the Capabilities Approach) in order to evaluate it on its own terms. I find that the theory is technocratic, despite Sen’s insistence to the contrary.

(2019) Rawls's Socialism and Pure Procedural Justice, Ethical Perspectives

Part of a symposium on John Rawls: Reticent Socialist by William Edmundson . In Edmundson’s account, pure procedural justice functions as a kind of limit to Rawls’s socialism, the point at which a socialist can find common ground with a critic of government and a defender of free markets like Hayek. Though I agree with much of what Edmundson says, I want to urge a reading of pure procedural justice that would bring Rawls more in line with Marx and further from Hayek.

(2016) Procedural Justice and Affirmative Action, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

There is widespread agreement among both supporters and opponents that affirmative action either must not violate any principle of equal opportunity or procedural justice, or if it does, it may do so only given current extenuating circumstances. Many believe that affirmative action is morally problematic, only justified to the extent that it brings us closer to the time when we will no longer need it. In other words, those that support affirmative action believe it is acceptable in nonideal theory, but not ideal theory. This paper argues that affirmative action is entirely compatible with equal opportunity and procedural justice and would be even in an ideal world. I defend a new analysis of Rawlsian procedural justice according to which it is permissible to interfere in the outcomes of procedures, and thus I show that affirmative action is not morally problematic in the way that many have supposed.

Media Appearances:

Newspaper Quotes:

(2018) CityLab

Meet the PHIMBYs In California, advocates who demand “Public Housing in My Backyard” have joined traditional NIMBY groups in fighting a bill designed to boost density in transit-accessible neighborhoods.

(2017) Slate

YIMBYs and the DSA can't get along despite their common enemy