Laura Seelkopf, Ph.D.
laura@seelkopf.eu
Assistant Professor
University of St Gallen
About Me:
I am assistant professor of international political economy at the School of Economics and Political Science, University of St.Gallen. Prior to taking up this position, I was Juniorprofessor at the Geschwister Scholl Institute (LMU), Max-Weber- and Jean-Monnet-Fellow at the European University Institute, postdoctoral researcher at the Jacobs University Bremen and at the University of Bremen, where I am still affiliated as Co-PI at the CRC1342. I hold a PhD from the University of Essex and an MA from the University of Konstanz. I am a member of the German Data Forum (since 2020), an executive board member of the German Political Science Association (since 2018) and its Political Economy Section (since 2015) as well as associate editor at the Journal of International Relations and Development (since 2018). My substantive research interests lie at the intersection of international political economy, comparative politics, and public policy. My current research focuses on two main topics: taxation (tax competition, tax evasion, and the transformation of tax states around the world) and social policy (in- and outside developed economies, by non-state actors, and via non-traditional policies). I am furthermore interested in research design, experiments, and quantitative methods.
Research Interests
Political Economy
Public Policy
Research Methods & Research Design
Development
Taxation
Social Policies
Foreign Aid
Income Inequality
Publications:
Journal Articles:
Developing economies need to increase their tax revenue. The international community is keenly aware of this challenge and recently dedicated substantial resources and advocacy to assist countries in mobilizing domestic tax revenue as part of the Sustainable Development Goals. Considering, however, the extensive research that foreign aid is often ineffective, it is not obvious that this tax assistance will help developing countries raise revenue. In this article, we assess the impact of international assistance programs for tax purposes (i.e., tax aid) on tax revenue generation, indirect taxation reform, and informality across the developing world. We analyze panel data of 137 developing countries between 1972 and 2013 from the AidData, International Centre for Tax and Development, and World Development Indicators, and World Bank Project Data datasets. We also assess survey data from the World Bank's Enterprise Survey and World Values Survey. Our findings indicate that tax aid does not robustly increase the number of taxpayers, especially in the short run. However, tax aid is effective in generating domestic tax revenue in precisely the way international agencies advocate, namely a strong reliance on the value-added tax.
This article describes the new Tax Introduction Dataset (TID). Listing the year and the mode of the first permanent introduction of six major taxes (inheritance tax, personal income tax, corporate income tax, social security contributions, general sales tax and value added tax) in 220 countries, 1750–2018, TID is the most comprehensive dataset of its kind. The comprehensiveness of our measure is of critical value to empirical work on the causes of tax innovation and its consequences for state, society and economy. In this paper, we explain the selection of our tax sample and the structure of the dataset, descriptively map temporal and regional patterns of tax introductions around the world, and draw on TID to investigate associations between tax introductions and economic development, war, and democratization.
The goal of this special issue is to highlight the importance of unconventional social policies, theorize their development in comparison with traditional welfare state accounts and outline a new research agenda. In this introduction to the special issue, the editors present the concept of social policy by other means as encompassing two kinds of unconventional social policy (from the point of view of mainstream comparative research): First, functional equivalents to formal systems of social protection and, second, non-state provision of benefits. The concept builds upon a sizeable, but fragmented literature in comparative welfare state research. While numerous examples demonstrate that social policy by other means is more pervasive in both OECD and non-OECD countries than often acknowledged, a brief survey of the top 20 articles in the field reveals that this fact is not sufficiently reflected in the academic literature. With reference to both existing studies and the contributions to this special issue, the editors go on to explore (1) the different forms of social policy by other means, (2) explanatory theories and (3) their effectiveness in terms of social outcomes. They close by outlining a research agenda.
It pays to be a tax haven. Ireland has become rich that way. Why do not all countries cut their capital taxes to get wealthy? One reason is structural. As the standard model of tax competition explains, small countries gain from competitive tax cuts while large countries suffer. Yet not all small (large) countries have low (high) capital taxes. Why? The reason, we argue, is political. While the standard model assumes governments to be democratic, more than a third of countries worldwide are non-democratic. We explain theoretically why autocracies are less likely to adjust to competitive constraints and test our argument empirically against data on the corporate tax policy of 99 countries from 1999 to 2011.
Comparative welfare state research is directed mainly toward the development of welfare states in advanced democracies, although the majority of people live outside the OECD and often face graver social risks arising from poverty and starvation. To secure a minimum standard of living, nearly all countries have introduced social programs to protect their citizens. Yet the timing of when governments take on the responsibility of providing social protection varies decisively across the world. Using data for 177 territories and independent states over the period from 1820 to 2013, we illustrate how social security legislation has emerged throughout the world. Although we find that the patterns and pathways vary strongly between different regions, the evidence shows that the proliferation of social protection is a transnational event: regional diffusion and membership in the International Labour Organization matter irrespective of the regional and temporal context.
Can governments increase tax compliance by rewarding honest taxpayers? We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment comparing tax compliance under a “deterrence” baseline with tax compliance under two “reward” treatments: a “donation” treatment giving taxpayers a say in the spending purposes of their payments and a “lucky” treatment giving taxpayers the (highly unlikely) chance of winning a lottery. The reward treatments significantly affected tax behaviour but not in a straightforward manner. Although female participants altered their behaviour as expected and complied somewhat more, men strongly reacted in the opposite manner: they evaded a much higher percentage of taxes than under the baseline. Apparently, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to boost tax compliance.
Media Appearances:
Radio Appearances:
Ungleichheit und Wohlfahrtsstaat (Inequality and the Welfare State)
Steuern und Gerechtigkeit (Taxation and Justice)
Blog Posts:
Die Corona-Krise des Steuerstaats (The Corona-Crisis of the Tax State)