Nora Bensahel, Ph.D.

bensahel@jhu.edu


Professor of Practice

Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)

Year of PhD: 1999

Country: United States (District of Columbia)

Website


Social Media:

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About Me:

Dr. Nora Bensahel is a Professor of Practice at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and a Contributing Editor and Columnist for War on the Rocks.  She is a renowned expert on U.S. defense policy, military operations, and the future of war.  She is also the co-author of the book Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime.

Before joining SAIS, Dr. Bensahel was a Distinguished Scholar in Residence at the School of International Service at American University and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. Prior to that, she was a senior fellow and co-director of the Responsible Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security. Her early career included over eleven years at the RAND Corporation, where she rose to the position of senior political scientist. She also spent more than a decade as an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, where she taught graduate classes and received the Alumni Leadership Council Teaching Award. 

Dr. Bensahel received her Ph.D. and M.A. degrees from the Department of Political Science at Stanford University, and her B.A. magna cum laude from Cornell University. While at Stanford, she worked as a research assistant for former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry.  She previously served on the Secretary of Defense’s Reserve Forces Policy Board, the Executive Board of the Leadership Council for Women in National Security (LCWINS),
and the President’s Council on Cornell Women.

Research Interests

US Defense Policy

Future Of War

US Military

Military Operations

Military Intervention

Civil-military Relations

National Security Policy

US Foreign Policy

NATO

Countries of Interest

United States

Publications:

Journal Articles:

(2024) Drones, The Air Littoral, and the Looming Irrelevance of the U.S. Air Force, War on the Rocks

Today, the U.S. Air Force faces an almost-existential crisis. During the past several years, the service has been battered by the loss of its prestigious space mission to the nascent U.S. Space Force. It has also struggled to balance the continued acquisition of stunningly expensive new manned aircraft with the rapid developments in unmanned technologies, which are making pilots increasingly superfluous... ...The breathtaking advance of drone warfare in ongoing conflicts is changing the meaning of air superiority and challenging traditional notions of airpower. In Ukraine, drones have largely displaced manned aircraft in the day-to-day fighting over the front lines, and they are actively contesting the brand-new subdomain of the air littoral. The U.S. Air Force has been slow to digest the epic changes in air warfare that these new rapidly expanding capabilities foretell. Facing similar disruptions to land warfare in the late 1990s, then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki told his generals: “If you don’t like change, you’re going to like irrelevance even less.” Today’s Air Force leadership would be wise to heed those candid words.

(2023) Learning from Real Wars: Gaza and Ukraine, War on the Rocks

The U.S. military spends untold time, energy, and effort preparing for its future wars. Yet periodically, real wars intrude to shatter hypothetical concepts and show how the ever-changing interaction of doctrine, technology, and leadership affects the character of war. The conflicts raging today in Ukraine and Gaza offer tragic examples of two markedly different kinds of modern wars — one largely a conventional battle between states raging across thousands of kilometers of disputed territory, and the other an unconventional clash between a terrorist group and a state battling in a cramped and densely populated urban area. Although it is still too early to declare any firm lessons from these ongoing conflicts, they can nevertheless illuminate some worrisome gaps in U.S. military thinking about its future conflicts. Here are three emerging areas where the U.S. military may be significantly unprepared for the rapidly changing character of modern war. They involve the challenges of large-scale urban warfare, a new definition of air superiority, and the fact that some private companies have essentially become combatants...

(2023) Addressing the U.S. Military Recruiting Crisis, War on the Rocks

The all-volunteer force may finally have reached its breaking point. During the first years of the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, many military experts worried that the constant deployments would “break” the force since they expected that fewer young Americans would volunteer to serve in a wartime military. Thankfully, that didn’t happen. Yet a perilous recruiting crisis began just after the United States fully withdrew from Afghanistan last summer, and it shows no sign of abating anytime soon. As a result, the U.S. military is shrinking, not because of any strategic choices, but simply because there aren’t enough qualified volunteers — and that may have enormous implications for the U.S. strategic position in an increasingly uncertain and dangerous world... The many intertwined causes of the recruiting crisis defy quick fixes, and none of them are likely to abate on their own even if unemployment rates increase once again. The services, military personnel and veterans, and the broader national security community all need to think creatively about ways to expand eligibility and increase propensity without undermining the strength and professionalism of the force. We hope that these recommendations provide a useful starting point for this important national conversation, and help catalyze broader efforts to develop innovative solutions to these deeply challenging problems.

(2022) The Other Big Lessons That The U.S. Army Should Learn from Ukraine, War on the Rocks

The war in Ukraine is the first major land war between two modern militaries equipped with advanced conventional weapons in decades. Its emerging lessons could fundamentally upend our understanding of conflicts that are primarily fought on land, and thus dramatically reshape the future of the U.S. Army. But the U.S. Army risks missing the most important lessons from the conflict, or, even worse, learning the wrong lessons entirely. The key lessons that could threaten its evolving new doctrine and expensive investments could too easily be abandoned or ignored, leaving the Army unprepared for the future battlefield.

(2021) Transforming the Army for the Twenty-First Century, Parameters

In an era of great power competition centered on warfighting domains other than land, the US Army faces difficult and likely painful choices. This reality, coupled with looming budget cuts, means the Army must reconsider its approach to capabilities and total force structure, its role in homeland security, and the relationship between its active and reserve components.

(2020) Reflections on the Curse of Racism in the U.S. Military, War on the Rocks

The new cadets at West Point had only been at the academy for a few short weeks when they were shuffled into the boxing section of the gym one evening for a lesson that had nothing to do with academics, physical fitness, marching, or inspections. Over the next hour and a half, an officer instructor patiently explained the realities of institutional racism, the inevitability of individual prejudice and bias, and the dangers of racial discrimination. He stressed that every aspect of military behavior ought to conform to absolute norms of fairness and equal treatment of everyone in uniform, regardless of race or color. If you’re picturing a bunch of social media-savvy, Generation Z cadets attending this lesson, your timeline is way off. This lesson didn’t take place in 2020 — or 2010, 2000, or even 1990. It took place in 1972, when one of us was a plebe at the academy. U.S. Army leaders then understood that as the Vietnam War was ending, they faced a massive crisis with racism and race relations within the force. And the topic was so urgent and so important that those leaders had made sure that talking about it openly and honestly was one of the key priorities carved into the jam-packed schedule of West Point’s newest class.... There is no silver bullet to fixing the U.S. military’s long-running problems with racism. It remains a reflection of the society it serves, and racism continues to run deeper in American society than many of us who do not face its sting every day often realize. But the recent senseless deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Ahmaud Arbery, and other African-Americans have forced the United States into a long-overdue reckoning. In this tense national environment, the U.S. military now has both an opportunity and an even greater obligation to help show the way forward by setting a positive example for the rest of society. It should aggressively assess the size and scope of its own problem with racism, and its leadership ought to set a clear and unequivocal course to put its own house in order. It needs to recapture the energy, commitment, and sense of urgency to attack this pernicious problem that was conveyed to those very young West Point cadets almost 50 years ago, and recommit itself to its ideals as an institution where every person is judged based on merit alone.

(2018) "Why Americans Aren't Really Worried About War with North Korea", War on the Rocks

The American is at best lukewarm to the idea of a war with North Korea. In September, two polls found that 58 percent of respondents supported military action against North Korea if peaceful means fail, but in a follow-up question, 63 percent said military action should only be taken with the support and participation of other countries. In October, polls showed that 62 percent opposed a preemptive strike on North Korea, and 64 percent believed the North Korean military program could be contained without military action. And a December poll showed that only 39 percent supported taking military action against North Korea to end its nuclear program, down from 49 percent three months earlier. With such tepid support, there should be a robust and heated U.S. national debate about going to war with North Korea — involving not just policymakers, but the public writ large. Instead, it sounds an awful lot like crickets.

(2017) "How to Talk to A Veteran", War on the Rocks

The growing gap between soldier and civilian underscores a quietly crumbling facet of American citizenship: the obligation of everyday citizens to understand and take responsibility for our military and its members, and to understand what we ask our men and women in uniform to do on our behalf. Connecting personally with the veterans around us can strengthen that bond and help restore some of that sense of responsibility between soldier and citizen.

(2017) "The Growing Danger of a Nuclear First Strike on North Korea", War on the Rocks

The escalating tensions over North Korea have brought the United States closer to war on the Korean peninsula than at any other time in decades. Yet Washington is just as likely as Pyongyang, if not more likely, to initiate the first strike — and would almost certainly use nuclear weapons to do so. Such a strike may be the only way to decisively end the North Korean nuclear program, but its incalculable effects would extend far beyond the devastation and destruction in Korea. Its political, economic, and moral consequences would permanently and disastrously undermine U.S. interests for generations to come — and must be avoided at all costs.

(2017) "The Three Things the Army Chief of Staff Wants You to Know", War on the Rocks

Milley delivered three big messages during the roughly hour-long event (which you can watch in its entirety). The first focused on preparing for the future battlefield, a subject he’s publicly addressed before. But the second and third ones staked out strikingly new ground, including the need to disobey orders (!) and a call-to-arms to his troops about their vital relationship with American society. His messages are important not only to soldiers, but to the American public and its leaders as well.

(2017) "Mirages of War: Six Illusions From Our Recent Conflicts", War on the Rocks

As this wartime generation continues to ascend to the most senior ranks of the U.S. military, they will have two major responsibilities: to provide military advice to policymakers and to make strategic choices about weapons and force structure that will determine how the United States will fight its future wars. However, their view of the future may be deeply affected by their past experiences in ways that they may not even be aware of. We believe that there are at least six illusions drawn from the recent wars that may seriously distort how these combat-experienced leaders think about and plan for future conflicts.

(2017) “Darker Shades of Gray: Why Gray Zone Conflicts Will Be More Frequent and Complex", Foreign Policy Research Institute

Gray zone conflicts are neither war nor peace, but instead lie somewhere in between. As I’ve written elsewhere, “their defining characteristic is ambiguity – about the ultimate objectives, the participants, whether international treaties and norms have been violated, and the role that military forces should play in response.” Such ambiguities enable adversaries to pursue their interests while staying below the threshold that would trigger a military response – and, if they remain ambiguous enough, they might avoid any response. They are therefore a smart approach for revisionist powers, who wish to change the current U.S.-led international order to better serve their own interests. According to Hal Brands, the goal of gray zone approaches “is to reap gains, whether territorial or otherwise, that are normally associated with victory in war. Yet gray zone approaches are meant to achieve those gains without escalating to overt warfare, without crossing established red-lines, and thus without exposing the practitioner to the penalties and risks that such escalation might bring.”

(2015) "Can the U.S. Military Stop Its Brain Drain?", The Atlantic

His surprising logic is that winning the unpredictable next war will be less about advanced war machines and silicon chips than about out-thinking the enemy, and having a force chock-full of bright, adaptive leaders who can quickly navigate complex problems under the intense time pressures of modern combat. To Carter, winning the next war is all about talent.

(2012) “Pivot but Hedge: A Strategy for Pivoting to Asia While Hedging in the Middle East,”, Orbis

The U.S. government's new emphasis on the Asia-Pacific represents a bold strategic choice that could animate U.S. national security policy for years to come. Yet the United States must balance its rightful new focus on the Asia-Pacific with the volatility that still exists in other areas of the world. The United States should pivot to the Asia-Pacific—but to protect its vital interests, it should also hedge against threats elsewhere, particularly in the greater Middle East. To implement a “Pivot but Hedge” strategy, the U.S. government should do three things. First, it should exercise caution when cutting the defense budget. Second, it should give the military services greater leadership roles in specific regions: naval and air forces should lead in the Asia-Pacific, while ground forces should lead in the greater Middle East. Third, it should maintain expansible, capable, and well-trained ground forces as a hedge against global uncertainty.

(2006) "Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with Iraqi Reconstruction", Journal of Strategic Studies

This article argues that the prewar planning process for postwar Iraq was plagued by myriad problems, including a dysfunctional interagency process, overly optimistic assumptions, and a lack of contingency planning for alternative outcomes. These problems were compounded by a lack of civilian capacity during the occupation period, which led to a complicated and often uncoordinated relationship with the military authorities who found themselves taking the lead in many reconstruction activities. Taken together, these mistakes meant that US success on the battlefield was merely a prelude to a postwar insurgency whose outcome remains very much in doubt more than three years later.

(2006) "A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation Against Terrorism", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

The term “coalition against terror” is commonly used, but is fundamentally misleading. Multiple coalitions against terror exist in different issue areasincluding military, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and reconstruction. These coalitions are independent of each other, and yet inextricably linked, both enabling and constraining each other's actions. Actions taken by the military coalition can undermine the intelligence coalition, for example, by destroying documents and other information during attacks. Overlapping membership may also cause challenges, for countries who disagree with the approach of one coalition many restrict their cooperation with the others. A successful counterterror strategy must account for the interactions of the various coalitions, understanding how actions taken in one area may cause tradeoffs and unintended consequences in others.

(1999) "Separable but not Separate Forces: NATO's Development of the Combined Joint Task Force", European Security

This article argues that the Combined Joint Task Force has profoundly affected the European security architecture. The CJTF structure shifted the terms of the European security debate from whether NATO should have a role in the post‐Cold War world to how NATO should act in this new security environment. The CJTF therefore helped NATO to survive its post‐Cold War existential dilemma, and to emerge with the same level of cohesion and cooperation that it possessed during the Cold War.

Books Written:

(2020) Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime, Oxford University Press

Adaptation under Fire looks at the essential importance of military adaptation in winning wars. Every military must prepare for future wars despite inevitably having little confidence about the precise shape that those wars will take. As former US secretary of defense Robert Gates once noted, the United States has a perfect record in predicting the next war: “We have never once gotten it right.” Despite this uncertainty, military organizations still must make choices. They must determine the nature of doctrine they will need to fight effectively, the type of weaponry and equipment they must procure to defeat their potential foe, and the kind of leaders they must select and develop to guide the force to victory. Since the US military has global security responsibilities, it will have to make these choices without knowing when, where, or how the next war will unfold, or even who the enemy may be. It will need to adapt quickly and successfully in the face of the unexpected in order to prevail. The book starts by providing a framework for understanding adaptation and includes several historical examples of success and failure. The second part examines US military adaptation during the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and explains why certain forms of adaptation have proven so problematic. The final part argues that the US military must become more adaptable in order to successfully address the fast-changing security challenges of the 21st century, and concludes with some recommendations on how it should do so.

(2008) After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq, RAND Corporation

This report provides an unclassified treatment of the post–major combat military and stabilization activities. It begins by examining prewar planning for postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for stabilization. The report then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003. Finally, the report examines civilian efforts at reconstruction, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Iraqi Interim Government

Book Chapters:

(2007) "International Institutions and Military Effectiveness: Fighting Alongside Allies and Partners", in Creating Military Power, Stanford University Press

Creating Military Power examines how societies, cultures, political structures, and the global environment affect countries' military organizations. Unlike most analyses of countries' military power, which focus on material and basic resources—such as the size of populations, technological and industrial base, and GNP—this volume takes a more expansive view. The study's overarching argument is that states' global environments and the particularities of their cultures, social structures, and political institutions often affect how they organize and prepare for war, and ultimately impact their effectiveness in battle. The creation of military power is only partially dependent on states' basic material and human assets. Wealth, technology, and human capital certainly matter for a country's ability to create military power, but equally important are the ways a state uses those resources, and this often depends on the political and social environment in which military activity takes place.

Other:

(2021) Biden Has Lifted the Military "Trans Ban." But There's More Work To Do., The Washington Post

...lifting the “trans ban” by executive order is no more than a good start. The new administration should now formulate legislation, preferably for its initial defense authorization request, to codify the policy as law. That would be a tougher task, demanding that the president spend some of his political capital — and after a bitterly contested election, his account is limited — on an issue that might seem to offer scant political reward. Nonetheless, much of doing the right thing involves doing it in the right way, and in this case, that matters very much.

(2016) The Future of the Army: Today, Tomorrow, and the Day After Tomorrow, Atlantic Council

The pernicious combination of a shrinking force, declining resources, increasing global commitments, and the renewed possibility of major power conflict present the Army with momentous strategic challenges. It is facing inevitable tradeoffs between the need to fight today’s wars while preparing for the possible wars of the future—and the need to pay for both in a declining budgetary environment. Army leaders must approach these challenges with imagination, creative solutions, and unrestrained thinking about both present and future wars. They must forge an Army that is up to all manner of tasks, staying faithful to the core values of their people and the profession of arms. In short, they must build the next US Army—a force that balances today’s demands with those of tomorrow, which could require much more from the force and its people. This report provides a range of recommendations to help Army leaders build the next Army successfully. For analytic reasons, we present recommendations for what the Army will need in three distinct time horizons: today (2016-2020); tomorrow (2020-2025); and the day after tomorrow (2025-2040 and beyond). In practice, though, there are no clear divisions among these time periods, and they will inevitably overlap. However, the Army must start preparing now for all of these time periods. Our report is designed to offer fresh ideas that spark debate, challenge hoary assumptions, and animate the need for change. We have one overriding goal: to ensure that the US Army remains the preeminent fighting force in the world for the remainder of this century.

(2013) Building Better Generals, Center for a New American Security

In Building Better Generals, the CNAS Responsible Defense (RD) team urges policymakers and military leaders to redouble their efforts to create an “adaptive and creative officer corps” that is prepared to address a wide range of 21st Century challenges. CNAS RD Program Director, LTG David Barno, USA (Ret)., Deputy Director of Studies Dr. Nora Bensahel and Research Associates Kelley Sayler and Katherine Kidder stress that after 12 years of irregular warfare, the combination of a volatile security environment, declining defense budgets, and newly constrained U.S. military capabilities risk producing an officer corps ill-prepared for its future challenges. Thus, the authors suggest new investments in flag officer education, assignments, and evaluations to better prepare senior military officers for the fast-moving dynamics of tomorrow’s world.

Media Appearances:

Radio Appearances:

(2024) BBC World Service

Why is the U.S. Army Struggling to Recruit New Soldiers?

(2023) Connecticut Public Radio

Addressing a Dire Recruiting Crisis

(2017) NPR's Here and Now

Reactions to the bombing of Syria

(2017) NPR's Marketplace

Discussion of the new UN Secretary General and his relationship with President Trump

(2017) NPR's Marketplace

Discussion of why President Trump does not like multilateral trade deals

(2017) Southern California Public Radio

Debate about whether women should be required to register for the draft

(2017) The Washington Post's Can He Do That?

Discussion of President Trump's authority to order airstrikes against Syria

(2016) NPR's All Things Considered

Discussion of how the different presidential candidates are pledging to address the threat from ISIS

(2015) The Diane Rehm Show

Discussion of the U.S. strategy against ISIS

(2014) The Diane Rehm Show

Discussion of the U.S. Strategy to Counter ISIS

Newspaper Quotes:

(2023) The Washington Post

Gaza and Ukraine Are Very Different Wars, But They Teach Similar Lessons

(2022) The Economist

The Pentagon Sharpens its Cultural Sword to Win Future Wars

(2021) The New York Times

Could Cyber War Make the World Safer?

(2021) The New York Times

Senate Confirms Austin, Installing First Black Defense Secretary

(2021) The New York Times

Where Fitness is the Job, Army Struggles to be a Fair Boss With Female Troops

(2017) New York Times

Reactions to the bombing of Syria

(2016) The Atlantic

Why Hillary Clinton is courting Republican foreign policy expers

(2016) The Hill

Discussion of the size of the U.S. Army

(2016) The New York Times

On the Senate vote to require women to register for the draft

(2016) Washington Post

How drafting women became a wedge issue during the presidential campaign

(2015) New York Times

On Senator John McCain's priorities as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee

(2015) The New York Times

Why Congress has resisted passing a new Authorization for the Use of Military Force

(2014) U.S. News and World Report

Discussion of the role of foreign policy and national security issues in President Obama's State of the Union address

(2013) The Washington Post

On the effects of the Department of Defense budget cuts

(2011) The Washington Post

On the effects of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' criticism of NATO allies

Other:

(2024) U.S. Naval War College Podcast

Analyzing Emerging Irregular Warfare Trends

(2023) Council on Foreign Relations Podcast

The U.S. Military Recruiting Crisis