Sara Benesh, Ph.D.
sbenesh@uwm.edu
Associate Professor
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Year of PhD: 1999
Country: United States (Wisconsin)
About Me:
I am Associate Professor and Chair of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee. I earned my PHD in 1999 from Michigan State University, studying under the incomparable Harold J. Spaeth. I study all aspects of the Supreme Court, as well as the Circuit Courts, and am currently and particularly interested in institutional legitimacy. I teach courses on civil rights and civil liberts, law and society, the Supreme Court, American Government, and research methods.
Research Interests
Judicial Politics
Legitimacy
Judicial Decision-Making
Criminal Justice Policy
U.S. Circuit Courts
U.S. Supreme Court
Countries of Interest
United States
Publications:
Journal Articles:
As judicial elections become increasingly expensive, recusal has emerged as a way to address concerns about the impartiality of judges who receive contributions from lawyers or potential litigants. While it is unclear if strict recusal rules are the best remedy for conflicts of interest created by contributions, they may disincentivize potential donors from investing in judicial campaigns by negating their potential goal of influencing decisions. We consider whether donor behavior in judicial campaigns – especially for those donors most likely to be interested in specifically currying favor with judges – responds to differences in recusal standards. Using data from 219 state supreme court races in 22 states from 2010 to 2020, we find that states with stricter recusal rules attract fewer campaign donations to judicial races, and states with more lax rules attract more overall and, most especially, for attorney donors.
This Article critically examines the role of procedural justice in shaping public perceptions of the U.S. Supreme Court’s legitimacy, particularly in light of recent Court actions, including the leak of a major opinion and the increasing, potentially politicized, use of its shadow docket. Drawing from the procedural justice model—which posits that legitimacy is primarily founded on the decision-making processes and principled judgments of the Court—this Article investigates whether the decline in confidence experienced by the Court can be attributed, at least in part, to its shadow docket. Utilizing an experimental survey conducted over three critical time points—coinciding with the leak of the Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization decision, its subsequent announcement, and a period of procedural calm—this Article measures the public’s reaction to various procedural scenarios, including the usage of the emergency docket. Results indicate that while the use of the emergency docket doesn’t substantially erode the Court’s diffuse support, it does impact how much respondents approve of how well the Court is doing its job, significantly so when filtered through policy agreement. This Article further finds that the Court’s Dobbs decision strongly influenced perceptions, particularly among those aware of the leak or the opinion, with disagreement causing more pronounced and consistent negative effects than the partial positive effects from agreement. These findings underscore the impact of the Court’s own behaviors on its perceived authority, suggesting that the justices’ actions, particularly their adherence to fair and transparent procedures, can bolster the Court’s legitimacy. As such, this Article highlights the urgent need for the Supreme Court to embrace resolving legal questions via due process in
Because decision making is complicated, political elites seek advice when making decisions, and the ways in which they use that advice has systematic features. But, analyses of decision making among elites usually fail to account for advice. We take advantage of unique information about the advice provided to one set of elites to empirically uncover the effect of advice. Specifically, we examine law clerk recommendations on cert to Justice Blackmun. We find that, even after controlling for known determinants of cert and considering sequential decision making, the advice of a trusted advisor matters greatly.
Existing scholarship on the voting behavior of U.S. Courts of Appeals judges finds that their decisions are best understood as a function of law, policy preferences, and factors relating to the institutional context of the circuit court. What previous studies have failed to consider, however, is that the ability to predict circuit judge decisions can vary in substantively important ways and that judges, in different stages of their careers, may behave distinctively. This article develops a theoretical framework which conceptualizes career stage to account for variability in voting by circuit judges and tests hypotheses by modeling the error variance in a vote choice model. The findings indicate that judges are more predictable in their voting during their early and late career stages. Case characteristics and institutional features of the circuit also affect voting consistency.
While studies of public confidence in institutions have long been a part of the public opinion literature, systematic analysis of public confidence in America’s lower courts has been missing. This is troubling, especially since support for the rule of law is integral to a democracy and support for courts essential to the operation of the rule of law. I offer an explanation of public support for lower courts, finding that experience with courts, perceptions regarding the fairness of court procedures, and choices made over institutional design all play a role in explaining the public’s support for state courts.
Other:
The Supreme Court Database is the definitive source for researchers, students, journalists, and citizens interested in the U.S. Supreme Court. The Database contains over two hundred pieces of information about each case decided by the Court between the 1791 and 2017 terms. Examples include the identity of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed, the parties to the suit, the legal provisions considered in the case, and the votes of the Justices.