Stephanie Hofmann, Ph.D.

stephanie.hofmann@graduateinstitute.ch


Full Professor

Graduate Institute, Geneva

Year of PhD: 2009

Country: Switzerland

About Me:

I am a Professor in the Department of International Relations and Political Science at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. I also serve as advisory faculty and faculty associate of the Graduate Institute’s Global Governance Center  and Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding.  My research revolves around issues in international security (primarily on what is referred to in the various organizations as either crisis management, peacekeeping or peace [support] operations and missions), international organizations, the interlinkages between global and regional understandings of order, European and transatlantic security, the interlinkages between regional economic and security cooperation as well as national foreign policy preference formation.

Research Interests

International Law & Organization

European Politics

Peacekeeping

Networks And Politics

Political Parties and Interest Groups

International Order

International Regime Complexity

Domestic Politics IR

Countries of Interest

France

Germany

United Kingdom

United States

Publications:

Journal Articles:

(2019) Frame contestation and collective securitization: the case of EU energy policy, West European Politics

with Ueli Staeger

(2019) The Politics of Overlapping Organizations: Hostage-taking, Forum shopping, and Brokering, Journal of European Public Policy

This paper contributes to theory development about the politics of overlapping organizations. It explains how organizational overlap can affect the execution of organizational mandates. Within the universe of intergovernmental overlapping organizations, I argue that we need to study institutional positions in conjunction with governmental preferences. Based on these two variables, member-states have different strategies at their disposal: hostage-taking, forum-shopping, and brokering. These strategies affect the formulation and implementation of multilateral commitments. Taking the EU-NATO overlap as an example, I show how these strategies can lead to compromised organizational mandates, where hostage-taking leads to long delays in sending troops, operational uncertainties and wasted resources and brokers are left with innovating informal solutions.