Country: United States (Indiana)
Tara Grillos (Ph.D., Harvard University) is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Purdue University. Her research focuses on human decision-making and behavior in the context of sustainable development. She is interested in questions of participation, deliberation, collective action, and public goods provision, particularly with respect to natural resource dilemmas in developing countries. Her work has been published in policy-oriented peer-reviewed journals, such as Nature Climate Change, Nature Sustainability, Ecological Economics and World Development.
Interventions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions strive to promote gender balance so that men and women have equal rights to participate in, and benefit from, decision-making about such interventions. One conventional way to achieve gender balance is to introduce gender quotas. Here we show that gender quotas make interventions more effective and lead to more equal sharing of intervention benefits. We conducted a randomized ‘lab’-in-the-field experiment in which 440 forest users from Indonesia, Peru and Tanzania made decisions about extraction and conservation in a forest common. We randomly assigned a gender quota to half of the participating groups, requiring that at least 50% of group members were women. Groups with the gender quota conserved more trees as a response to a ‘payment for ecosystem services’ intervention and shared the payment more equally. We attribute this effect to the gender composition of the group, not the presence of female leaders.
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) represent a popular strategy for environmental protection, and tropical forest conservation in particular. Little is known, however, about their effectiveness. Many argue that even if PES increase conservation while payments last, they may adversely affect other motivations for pro-environmental behaviour in the longer term. We test whether conditional payments also encourage forest users to conserve shared forest resources after payments end. Using a framed field experiment with 1,200 tropical forest users in five countries, we show that (1) during the intervention, conditional payments increased conservation behaviour; (2) after payments stopped, users continued to conserve more on average than they did before the intervention, especially when they were able to communicate with each other; and (3) trust amplified the lasting conservation effects of the interventions. PES effectiveness may increase when interventions facilitate interpersonal communication and when implemented in contexts where forest users enjoy high levels of trust.
Greater inclusion of women is widely believed to improve environmental decision outcomes. Pastoralism faces increased vulnerability to climate change, and pastoralist women are both disproportionately affected by severe drought and underrepresented in formal decision-making processes. Increased participation by women in decision-making thus promises to offer a win–win solution: greater gender equality as well as enhanced resilience to persistent drought. This quasi-experimental study evaluates an intervention that aimed to increase drought preparedness in northern Kenyan pastoralist communities through the empowerment of women at the household and community levels. It uses a difference-in-differences design combined with matching estimation to causally isolate effects of the intervention. At the community level, there was an increase in women's political awareness and participation in formal decision-making processes, but that participation did not translate into meaningful outcomes. At the household level, however, there was a large and positive effect on actions taken to better prepare for drought (which mostly took the form of pre-emptive livestock sales). Given the entrenched gender roles related to livestock sales in this setting, this finding is encouraging and warrants further research.
This study examines the motivations that drive participation in a compensation program for environmental conservation in Bolivia. Previous research on payments programs suggests that institutions that appeal to both economic and non-material incentives should be encouraged. This program attempts such a strategy, offering in-kind compensation for conservation while simultaneously attempting to engage with environmental values and traditional social norms. I take advantage of a comprehensive household survey conducted prior to the offer of the program and employ means-comparison tests and multi-level regression analysis to compare those who chose to participate with those who did not. My research examines whether motivations for participating in this program reflected purely financial calculations regarding the costs and benefits of the program, or whether non-financial motivations such as environmental or social beliefs and norms played a role as well. I find evidence that the program's effort to engage with social motivations was successful and that social factors, not financial incentives alone, affect participation in the program. Findings also suggest that environmental values did not play a very large role, and that the financial determinants of participation are related mainly to prohibitive costs or barriers to entry, rather than the size of anticipated benefits.
This paper examines a participatory budgeting process in the city of Surakarta (Solo), Indonesia. Using newly digitized records of the infrastructure spending results from three distinct phases of the process (proposal, prioritization, and implementation), I assess the degree to which the resulting geographical distribution of spending allocations targets the poor. I find a poverty-related bias in the distribution of infrastructure projects funded by the program. While results vary across neighborhoods, on average, sub-units with more poor people receive a smaller percentage of funding than would correspond to their share of the general population. Furthermore, although the implementation stage exhibits significant divergence from the decisions made during the more public proposal and prioritization processes, the small group of elected officials in charge of implementation are not to blame for the bias. I find no evidence that deviations from decisions made during public meetings are based on something other than legitimate technical considerations. Instead, the bias originates in the proposal stage, with the poorest sub-units less likely to submit proposals in the first place. I conclude that the literature would benefit from more studies that look at differences across stages of decision-making within a particular process. Whereas contextual differences across settings may be difficult to change over the short-run, identifying procedural differences and points of vulnerability across a single process can help to diagnose problems which have the potential to actually be resolved by policy-makers.